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TAXATION AND U.S.
MULTINATIONAL
INVESTMENT
James R. Hines, Jr.
Princeton University and NBER

In 1985, nonbank U.S. multinational companies employed 24.5 million
workers, had worldwide sales of almost $3.5 trillion, and net income of
$150 billion on assets of $4.2 trillion. The foreign (non-U.S.) affiliates of
these companies had 6.4 million employees, $900 billion of those sales, and
$43 billion of net income, with assets of $838 billion. United States
multinationals accounted for roughly three-quarters of total American
merchandise exports in 1985 and half of total imports, with approximately
40 percent of each category arising from transfers within U.S. multinationals between American parent firms and their own foreign affiliates. 1 And
1985 is widely regarded as a sluggish year for U.S. multinationals.
By any measure, U.S. multinationals play an important role in the world
economy. Yet multinational corporations operate in economic and legal
environments that are often extremely complex and subject to abrupt
changes. Volatility in exchange rates is one recent example of such changes;
the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) is another. The recent U.S. tax
change seems likely to have a considerable effect on the net earnings U.S.
multinationals can expect to get abroad.
This paper was prepared for presentation at the NBER Tax Policy and the Economy
Conference, Washington, D. C., November 1987. I am grateful to Mark Gersovitz, Gene
Grossman, David Hartman, Joosung Jun, Scott Newlon, James Poterba, Harvey Rosen,
Lawrence Summers, and especially Daniel Frisch for helpful comments and to David Andres
and Joseph Marucci of Price Waterhouse-Princeton for data they provided.
1

Data on U.S. multinationals in 1985 is reported in Brereton (1987).
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This chapter analyzes the impact of the U.S. tax system on overseas
investments of U.S. multinationals. The TRA is just the most recent in a
series of significant changes over the last twenty-five years in the U.S. tax
law that applies to the foreign earnings of U.S. companies. The issue of
U.S. tax incentives for overseas investments arises time and again in policy
debates in the United States, as the goals of domestic employment and
competitiveness in foreign markets compete with each other for legislative
support. There is a widely held view that the U.S. tax system encourages
American companies to invest excessively abroad, thereby depriving this
country of capital, jobs, and productivity growth. However desirable it may
be to encourage U.S. companies to invest their capital abroad, there
appears to be little in the way of hard analysis of current and past incentives
provided by the U.S. tax system. This chapter argues that the U.S. tax
system has served to discourage foreign investment by U.S. multinationals
more than is widely believed, but that the TRA has substantially reduced
this negative incentive.
Section 1 examines some of the striking effects that foreign country tax
systems have had on U.S. multinational activity. Section 2 describes the
method by which the United States taxes the foreign income of its
multinationals, and some of the theoretical implications of this system.
Section 3 presents and analyzes recent data on U.S. and foreign tax
collections from U.S. multinationals. Section 4 examines the financial
behavior of U.S. multinationals and its tax consequences. Section 5 presents new estimates of effective tax rates on U.S. multinational investments
in selected countries and considers recent investment behavior in the light
of these estimates. Section 6 is the conclusion.

1. TAX HAVENS AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY
Foreign countries are free to choose whatever tax regimes they want to
impose on multinationals operating within their boundaries. Not surprisingly, tax rates vary widely from one country to another. In addition, many
countries have signed bilateral tax treaties with other countries providing
for mutual special tax treatment of the income from each others' multinational investments.
Tax havens are countries with very low rates of taxation of foreign
investment. The governments of these countries are presumably willing to
sacrifice some potential tax revenue in return for the employment, technology, and capital that foreign multinationals can provide. For U.S. firms
investing overseas, the most important tax havens include the Bahamas,
the Netherlands Antilles, Bermuda, Panama, Hong Kong, Liberia, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. By offering very low tax rates to induce foreign
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TABLE 1

Tax Havens and U.S. Multinationals, 1982

Country
Bahamas
Netherlands Antilles
Bermuda
Panama
All countries

Foreign
source
taxable
income

GNP

$ 2,222

$ 840

1,152
552
1,259
57,059

1,370
790
4,060

MNC
income
% of
GNP
264.5
84.1
69.9
31.0
0.8

Current
year
foreign
taxes

Average
tax rate

40
196
3
239
21,998

1.8
17.0
0.5
19.0
38.6

$

(%)

Note: Dollar amounts are millions of current (1982) dollars.
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury (1985).

investment, these countries provide a simple illustration of the ability of
taxes to affect economic behavior.
Table 1 reports the taxable activity of U.S. multinationals in tax havens in
1982. A quick glance at the level of U.S. multinational earnings in the
Bahamas, the Netherlands Antilles, Bermuda, and Panama is enough to
suggest the conclusion that something, most likely favorable tax treatment,
is inducing U.S. multinationals to concentrate an inordinate share of their
income production in tax havens. 2 And since (as will be discussed shortly)
the tax law discourages U.S. multinationals with operations in low-tax
countries from taking actions that make their foreign source income
taxable, the true foreign source income generated in these tax havens is
quite likely to be greater than the reported figures.
The common wisdom in government and industry circles is that U.S.
multinationals have over the last twenty years become increasingly adept at
planning their overseas investment and financing activity in order to
minimize tax obligations. All other things equal, one obvious way to avoid
taxes is to locate as much foreign income production as possible in tax
havens. Of course, there may be more geographical discretion in some
industries than in others. Table 2 explores recent trends in tax haven
activity of U.S. multinationals. The tax haven fraction of worldwide pretax
earnings of the controlled foreign corporations of U.S. multinationals rose
from 11 to 20 percent over the period 1968--1982. As the table suggests, this
use rise is largely attributable to a greater fraction of U.S. multinational
profits coming from the wholesale trade and finance, insurance, and real
Strictly speaking, U.S. multinationals report inordinate earnings in tax havens. How much of
these profits is the product of tax-avoiding accounting tricks is impossible to gauge.

2
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TABLE 2

Growth of Tax Haven Activity By Controlled Foreign Corporations of
U.S. Multinationals 1968-1982
Earnings before tax of CFCs

Industry of CFCs

Year

In tax
havens

All industries

1968
1972
1980
1982
1968
1972
1980
1968
1972
1980
1968
1972
1980
1968
1972
1980

$855
1,972
6,681
7,405
109
422
2,048
285
731
2,220
34
113
365
427
706
2,048

Finance, insurance, and real estate
Wholesale trade
Services
Other industries

In all
countries
$7,744
15,356
47,622
36,696
358
1,190
4,822
1,323
2,141
9,890
117
589
1,841
5,886
1,436
31,069

In tax
havens
(%)

11.0
12.8
14.0
20.2
30.4
35.5
42.5
21.5
34.1
22.4
19.2
19.2
19.8
7.3
6.2
6.6

Note: Dollar amounts are millions of current dollars. The following constitute the tax havens: the
Bahamas, the Netherlands Antilles, Bermuda, Panama, Hong Kong, Liberia, Luxembourg, and
Switzerland.
Source: States (1986-1987). Detailed industry earnings are not available by country for 1982.

estate industries, which have proclivities for tax haven locations. Indeed,
the rising importance of these industries may in part be due to their ability
to locate in low-tax countries.
The casual evidence from tax havens is consistent with the view that
foreign tax systems influence the investment decisions of U.S. multinationals, and that this influence is growing. For those interested in American tax
policy, the next question is to what extent the U.S. tax code affects the
overseas investment decisions of our multinationals. In order to address
that question, it is necessary to consider in detail some of the provisions of
the code as they affect the taxation of foreign source income.

2. THE TAX SYSTEM
The tax treatment of income generated by overseas investments of U.S.
multinational corporations is extremely complicated. This section contains
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a brief description of some of its primary features. To begin with, the
United States uses a "residence" standard to tax its corporations, which
means that U.S. corporations owe tax to the U.S. Treasury on all of their
worldwide income, wherever earned. (The alternative system would be
one of "territorial" taxation, under which the U.S. would tax only that
corporate income actually earned in the United States and would not tax at
all the offshore earnings of U.S. corporations. A number of European
countries, including France and the Netherlands, use territorial-type tax
systems.)
Thus, when U.S. multinationals earn profits in other countries, they owe
U.S. taxes on these profits. In addition, U.S. multinationals are typically
required to pay income and other taxes to the foreign countries in which
they operate. Being subject to the tax authorities of not only their home
country (the United States) but also their host countries (e.g., West
Germany), ordinary treatment of the profits earned abroad by U.S. multinationals would subject them to double taxation. In order to prevent the
same profits from being taxed twice, the U.S. tax system permits firms to
receive a credit for income taxes paid to other governments. Under the
credit system,. U.S. multinationals first pay their foreign taxes and then
calculate the taxes they would owe to the U.S. government based on their
(pretax) worldwide income just as if all of their income were earned
domestically in the United States. The income taxes paid to foreign
governments are then credited toward payment of U.S. taxes, so that taxes
otherwise owed the U.S. Treasury are reduced dollar for dollar by taxes
paid to other governments. The practical operation of this credit can be
anything but straightforward, however.
To take a simple example, suppose that a U.S. manufacturing firm has a
branch in a foreign country that imposes a 20 percent tax on corporate
profits. Assume the effective tax rate on U.S. corporations to be 34 percent.
Upon earning $100 through the foreign branch, the firm will owe $20 to the
foreign government and $14 ($100 x 0.34 - $20) to the U.S. government.
This calculation assumes the absence of a number of important real-world
complications (discussed later).
United States corporations investing overseas generally can choose from
among several forms of legal organization for these investments, an option
that complicates tax analysis, since this choice may have dramatic tax
consequences. The primary decision facing a U.S. multinational is whether
to organize its foreign operation as a branch or as a controlled foreign
corporation (CFC). 3 Branch operations are considered by U.S. law to be
United States multinationals can also organize their foreign affiliates with less than 50
percent U.S. ownership, thereby not qualifying as CFCs, but since there are reasons not to do
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integral components of the domestic U.S. corporation, so branch profits,
losses, deductions, taxes paid, and other financial activities are all treated
as if performed by the U.S. corporation. Not so with CFCs, which are
legally separate entities, incorporated in host countries (e.g., West Germany), and are more than 50 percent owned by U.S. shareholders, each of
which has at least 10% of the stock. 4 Host countries often impose somewhat different tax and legal requirements on CFCs than they do on branch
operations of U.S. multinationals. But the U.S. tax system treats CFCs very
differently than it does foreign branches of U.S. companies.
The most important tax distinction between foreign branches and CFCs
is that the United States taxes profits of the CFCs of U.S. multinationals
only when CFCs send profits back to their U.S. parent companies. Legally,
CFCs are entirely separate entities from the U.S. parent companies that
own them, and it is only the U.S. parents that, strictly speaking, have tax
obligations to the U.S. government. A U.S. parent is considered to earn
income on its CFC investment only when that income is returned to the
U.S. (with some exceptions). Thus, if a 100 percent American-owned CFC
operates in Japan and runs up large profits there but does not pay out any
dividends to the American corporation that owns its stock, then no U.S. tax
liability is generated that year. Of course, U.S. taxes on those profits may
have to be paid at some point in the future, if and when the profits are
ultimately repatriated to the U.S. parent corporation.
When U.S. parent companies receive dividends from their CFCs, they
calculate the U.S. taxes they owe based on the income they receive plus the
foreign taxes credited to this income. 5 The tax credit system is designed to
treat repatriated CFC income in the same way that an equal amount of
branch income would be treated. One legal complication is that when a
foreign government taxes branch income, it is the U.S. corporation that
so and they typically use CFCs, the analysis in this paper assumes all nonbranch overseas
operations of U.S. multinationals to be CFCs.
One question that naturally arises is, what are the consequences of less than 50 percent U.S.
ownership of a foreign corporation? If an individual corporation owns less than 10 percent of
foreign corporation, then it is not entitled to use the foreign tax credit when it receives taxable
dividends in the United States. On the other hand, the Subpart F restrictions apply only to
corporations that qualify as CFCs. Of course, there are a number of nontax reasons why a
corporation might want more than 50 percent control of a foreign subsidiary. And the foreign
corporation would presumably be less inclined to follow financial policies aimed at minimizing U.S. taxes of its shareholders if American firms own less than half the shares. In practice,
in 1985 more than 75 percent of the U.S. share of earnings and assets of foreign corporation
were located in majority-owned foreign affiliates, which includes foreign branches and a
subset of all CFCs (see Brereton (1987)).

4

The 85 percent exclusion rule, which provides that U.S. corporations are taxed on only 15
percent of the dividends they receive on their corporate stock holdings, does not apply to
dividends received from foreign corporations.
5
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officially pays the tax, whereas income tax paid by a CFC to a foreign
government is, strictly speaking, paid by the CFC, not the U.S. corporation
that owns the CFC. To handle this situation, the law provides that when
the U.S. parent calculates the U.S. taxes it owes on dividends received from
a CFC, the taxes paid to the foreign government by the CFC on this income
are "deemed paid" by the U.S. parent and thereby can be added to the
foreign tax credit the U.S. parent gets for foreign taxes paid on branch
income.
When a U.S. parent corporation receives dividends from a CFC, the U.S.
parent must determine the appropriate foreign tax credit (FTC) allowable
on this income. Foreign tax credits have several sources, the most important being foreign withholding taxes and foreign income taxes. Many
countries impose withholding taxes on CFC dividends remitted to U.S.
parents, and U.S. corporations are allowed to credit these taxes toward
their U.S. tax payments. 6 It is trickier to calculate the allowable tax credit for
the income taxes paid by the CFC. The basic method is to calculate the
fraction of the current year's after-tax CFC income represented by the
dividend, and multiply that fraction by the foreign taxes paid by the CFC
to arrive at the foreign taxes the U.S. parent can credit toward its U.S. taxes.
Table 3 illustrates this procedure for a simple example.
In this example, a U.S. parent corporation is assumed to own 75 percent
of a foreign corporation that in the current year earns $5,000 in profits. The
foreign income tax rate is assumed to be 20 percent, so the CFC pays
foreign income tax of $1,000 and has $4,000 in after-tax profits. Assume the
foreign corporation to pay out 60 percent of its after-tax profits as dividends, and that the foreign government imposes a 10 percent withholding
tax on dividends sent to foreign shareholders. Since the American parent is
entitled to 75 percent of the dividends paid out, it gets $1,800 minus the 10
percent withholding tax, or $1,620.
In calculating its U.S. tax liability, the U.S. parent is allowed to take a tax
credit for the $180 withholding tax paid on its dividend, plus a fraction of
the $1,000 paid this year by the CFC in income taxes. The fraction is
determined by the ratio of the parent's pre-withholding-tax dividend
($1,800) to the CFC's after-tax income ($4,000), in this case 45%. Thus, the
U.S. parent gets a tax credit of $450 for "deemed paid" income taxes plus
$180 for withholding taxes. But the U.S. parent is also required to "gross
up" the dividend it receives from the CFC by the amount of the foreign
Strictly speaking, though they never actually see the money, the U.S. parent corporations
pay these withholding taxes out of the dividends they would have received from their CFCs.
Foreign governments require the CFCs to be withholding agents for these payments. As a
result, the U.S. parents get full tax credits for the withholding taxes, and the foreign
governments can lean on CFCs located in their countries to ensure that taxes are paid.
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TABLE 3

Illustrative Computation-U.S. Tax Liability from Repatriated
CFC Profits
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Pretax earnings of CFC
Foreign income tax at 20 percent
Net earnings and profits: (1) - (2)
Dividend paid to all shareholders: 60% of (3), by assumption
Dividend paid to U.S. parent company: 75% of (4), by
assumption
(6) Foreign withholding tax at 10%: 10% of (5)
(7) Net dividend received in U.S.: (5) - (6)
Foreign creditable taxes:
Direct credit for withholding tax
Deemed paid credit for subsidiary's income tax:
[(5)/(3)] X (2)
(8) Total creditable taxes
Includable as U.S. income:
Dividend received
Foreign deemed paid tax
(9) Total grossed-up foreign dividend
(10) U.S. tax due: 34% of (9)
(11) Foreign tax credit
(12) Net payment due U.S. government: (10) - (11)

$5,000
1,000
4,000
2,400
1,800
180

1,620
180
450
630
1,800
450
2,250
765
630
135

Note: This table presents the end-of-year tax calculation for a U.S. parent company that owns 75
percent of a foreign corporation. The foreign income tax rate is assumed to be 20 percent, the foreign
government imposes a 10 percent withholding tax on dividends paid to U.S. shareholders, and the
foreign corporation pays out 60 percent of its after-tax earnings as dividends.

taxes deemed paid, so the U.S. tax liability is based on $2,250 of foreign
income. At a U.S. tax rate of 34 percent, the U.S. parent owes $765 in U.S.
taxes, but it can subtract $630 in FTCs from this amount to yield a net
payment due the U.S. government of $135.

2.1 Some Complications
Although the FTC can be a strong palliative for the burden of foreign taxes,
there are limits to the credit's applicability. For example, the FTC can be
claimed only for income taxes; other types of taxes paid (or deemed paid)
to foreign governments can generally be deducted like other business
expenses but are not eligible for the credit. The distinction between foreign
income taxes and other types of foreign taxes is, for this reason, important,
but the distinction is sometimes murky. The law is designed to prevent
U.S. multinationals from obtaining a U.S. tax credit for paying user fees
disguised as foreign income taxes, but in practice it seems that the law
disallows FTCs whenever the foreign taxes do not resemble U.S. corporate
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income taxes. 7 On the other hand, withholding taxes on dividend remittances generally qualify as creditable income taxes, since they are attributed
to be "in lieu of" income taxes that foreigners would have paid to their own
governments had they been the shareholders.
In addition, there is an overall limit to the FTC: the law stipulates that a
firm cannot apply more FTCs toward its U.S. tax liability than the total of
its foreign source income times the average U.S. tax rate it pays. The FTC
limitation is designed to enforce the restriction that FTCs cannot be used to
offset taxes due on domestic U.S. income. That part of foreign taxes paid at
a rate higher than the U.S. rate cannot be used as a tax credit in the current
year. Since 1976, the U.S. government has required U.S. multinationals to
average their worldwide foreign income and foreign taxes for purposes of
calculating taxes and credits. This requirement limits the ability of U.S.
firms to reduce their taxable income through foreign losses, but it allows
firms to get credits for taxes paid in high-tax foreign countries by averaging
with operations in low-tax countries. The slight nonlinearity of the U.S.
corporate tax rate also affects the FTC limit, since the limit is based on
average rather than marginal rates. Under the pre-TRA the U.S. corporate
tax rate started at 15 percent and became 46 percent only once a corporation
had income of $100,000; furthermore, capital gains were taxed at 28
percent. Hence, a corporation that had much of its income in capital gains
or that had low profits (or better yet, losses) would have an average tax rate
below 46 percent and could credit only those foreign taxes that did not
exceed this rate.
The structure of the FTC mechanism means that tax timing issues loom
large for some U.S. multinationals, particularly those with substantial
variations in foreign and domestic income. If a U.S. multinational cannot
use all of its FTCs currently, it is permitted to carry them back up to two
years or forward up to five years to reduce U.S. tax obligations on eligible
foreign source income. Indeed, there is a significant inventory of unused
FTCs that U.S. corporations carry forward each year. 8
Another complication arises when CFCs pay out dividends exceeding
their current year's income. In that event, the excess of current dividends
over current income is attributed to previous years' undistributed incomes
in reverse order, last year first. Firms are required, in other words, to keep
7 For example, certain foreign oil income taxes based on "posted price" rather than market
revenues were disqualified as income taxes. McDaniel and Ault (1981) contains a discussion
of this issue.

For example, U.S. corporations carried accumulated FTCs of $17.5 billion forward into 1982
while acquiring an additional $20.7 billion credit that year. Only $18.9 billion of those FTCs
could be used in 1982, the bulk of the difference presumably eligible to be carried forward into
future years. (See Barlow (1986) for 1982 data.)
8
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inventories of each year's income and dividends, reducing the inventories
in last-in-first-out fashion as future dividends exceed future earnings.
Given this accounting system, it is in the interest of U.S. multinationals that
do not bump up against the FTC limit to receive dividends selectively from
those of their CFCs having higher-than-average foreign tax years. Indeed,
CFCs may reduce their overall tax burdens by taking actions that raise their
average foreign tax burdens but at the same time increase their variability
so that dividends can be paid in high-tax years. Industry sources suggest
that firms make widespread use of this so-called "rhythm method" of
paying dividends. The TRA limited (but did not eliminate) the ability of
U.S. corporations to profit from year-to-year fluctuations in their CFCs'
average foreign tax rates by providing that all post-1986 CFC earnings and
foreign taxes be pooled to construct a multiple-year average foreign tax rate
for purposes of calculating the indirect FTC.
Confident in the ability of U.S. corporations to exploit opportunities for
tax avoidance, the U.S. Congress has written into the law a number of
provisions that trigger tax obligations of U.S. parent companies for certain
actions taken by their CFCs. The most important such provisions are the
Subpart F rules, which were adopted in 1962. These rules attempt to
discourage U.S. parents of CFCs from indefinitely delaying the repatriation
of CFC income if minimizing U.S. taxes were the goal behind their
no-dividend strategy.
The Subpart F rules provide that certain types of CFC expenditures or
investments will be treated as if they were dividend payments to the U.S.
parent, and hence will increase the U.S. tax obligation of the parent
company. The most important category of these financial activities is
passive investments. Thus, the profits of a U.S. multinational's French CFC
are not taxable by the U.S. if reinvested in the French business, but the
same profits if invested by the nonbank CFC in French bonds earn interest
that is taxable in the United States as earned.
The Subpart F rules generally prevent nonfinancial CFCs from making
financial investments in lieu of returning dividends to the United States.
Besides passive investment income, Subpart F requires CFC investments in
U.S. property and insurance of U.S. risks to be taxable as if the money were
repatriated to the U.S. parent. Various earnings by CFCs in countries
outside their host country trigger Subpart F tax liabilities, as do foreign
illegal payments and income earned in countries that engage in certain
illegal boycotts. Once the U.S. parent incurs a tax liability through Subpart
F, however, the Subpart F income can be repatriated to the United States
without any further U.S. tax consequences.
The taxation of foreign source income raises issues that are not present or
are less important to domestic business taxation. For example, the alloca-
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tion of income between countries can have very large tax consequences for
U.S. multinationals. It is generally in the interest of multinationals to earn
their income in low-tax jurisdictions. (Although, once earned, multinationals have incentives to attribute income to high-tax sources for FTC purposes.) Thus it might be tempting for U.S. multinationals to sell
intermediate products to their foreign affiliates located in tax havens, at
bargain prices, and to locate the head office and as many companywide
fixed expenditures as possible in high-tax countries. But U.S. law generally
requires firms to use market prices (or the equivalent) for intracompany
transfers and to allocate fixed costs according to formulas based on criteria
such as sales and assets. The law also restricts even the tax location of some
assets; for example, income earned by Americans in outer space or in
Antarctica is taxed as though earned on the ground in the United States. 9
Other features of the tax law applying to foreign source income include
much less generous investment incentives than those given to domestic
capital until the recent tax reform. Foreign investments are not eligible for
the investment tax credit and must be depreciated for tax purposes over
long lifetimes. Special rules apply to foreign oil and gas income, and there
are special recapture provisions that recoup in subsequent years tax losses
that are usually associated with those industries. More generally, the TRA
requires various baskets of foreign earning sources to keep separate
accounts in hopes of preventing high foreign tax income, such as that
derived from petroleum, from pooling tax credits with low foreign tax
income from other sources. Other significant changes included in the tax
reform include the introduction of functional currencies for foreign affiliates. Before passage of the TRA, the law was unclear over the appropriate
way to treat for tax purposes changes in the value of foreign affiliates
resulting from exchange rate movements. Under current law, each foreign
affiliate chooses (usually) one functional currency and earns taxable income
only for transactions in that currency.

2.2 Implications for Investment Behavior
The most striking features of U.S. taxation of multinational income are the
provisions for credit and deferral. From a static and purely self-interested
perspective, it may be hard to understand why the U.S. government
permits a tax credit for foreign taxes paid. Taking the tax systems of foreign
governments as given, foreign taxes paid by U.S. companies are costs of
doing business and nothing more. As such, one might expect the U.S.
government to permit a U.S. tax deduction for foreign taxes paid; but a
credit goes beyond that. The FTC mitigates the double taxation of U.S.
9

Special rules apply to communications satellites.
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multinationals on their foreign earnings but does so by allowing foreign
governments to extract tax revenues from U.S. companies without fear of
excessively discouraging U.S. investment within their borders, since the
cost is borne largely by the U.S. Treasury. In fact, even a tax deduction for
foreign taxes paid might represent too generous a policy, since if American
capital as a whole has market power overseas the U.S. government could
create rents by taxing multinational investments (relative to allowing a
deduction), restricting the quantity of American investments and raising
their returns. But neither of these alternatives---a tax deduction for foreign
taxes paid or only a partial deduction (or tax)-may make sense if other
countries are thereby encouraged to adopt similar policies in taxing the
U.S. investments of their own multinationals. All countries can be worse
off in a worldwide regime of heavy double taxation of multinational
income. The FTC is probably best understood as a measure designed to
preserve an international political equilibrium of limited multinational
taxes.
The deferral of U.S. taxes on unrepatriated CFC income further encourages U.S. investment abroad. By reinvesting their foreign CFC earnings in
active investments in foreign host countries, where tax rates are lower than
the U.S. tax rate, U.S. multinationals can effectively earn interest abroad on
what would have been taxes due to the U.S. government. Even though
U.S. taxes are ultimately due on all foreign earnings, firms are generally
better off by delaying their U.S. tax payments. Hence deferral has two
consequences: it may encourage initial equity investments by U.S. parents
in their foreign CFCs, since the returns are lightly taxed, and CFCs have
particularly strong incentives to invest out of retained earnings, since those
funds are subject to U.S. tax if not reinvested.
The deferral of U.S. taxes is widely thought to have substantial effects on
CFC investment behavior. Horst (1977) argues that deferral lowers (in the
case of a U.S. tax rate that is higher than foreign taxes) the effective tax rate
on CFC investments to a weighted average of U.S. and foreign tax rates,
with weights determined by the CFC's (fixed) dividend payout ratio.
Hartman (1985) argues that deferral is even more powerful than that: he
claims that the reinvestment decisions of mature CFCs will be completely
unaffected by U.S. tax considerations. Newlon (1987) arrives at the same
conclusion, using a model that includes the full range of financial options
available to the multinational firm. In the Hartman and Newlon models the
U.S. tax system can affect only the initial equity investments of U.S.
multinationals overseas. Once firms have sufficient retained earnings
abroad, they finance their own investments out of these earnings as if the
U.S. tax rate on this income were zero. Assuming foreign tax rates to be
lower than U.S. rates, CFCs of U.S. multinationals will therefore reinvest
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their earnings to a greater degree than would those companies in the
United States. Hartman (1981), Frisch and Hartman (1983), and Baskin and
Gale (1987) tested whether domestic tax variables affect foreign investment
by U.S. multinationals out of retained earnings and found no significant
effect. But these regressions encounter difficulties acknowledged by the
authors, and in section 5 explores channels through which U.S. taxes affect
CFC reinvestment decisions that the earlier studies do not incorporate.
United States companies are not the only entities whose behavior is
likely to be affected by U.S. provisions for taxing the foreign income of U.S.
multinationals. Foreign governments may respond, or threaten to respond,
in a retaliatory fashion to aggressive U.S. tax increases. The worldwide
averaging provision of the U.S. tax code may encourage some high-tax
countries to raise their taxes on U.S. multinationals in order to free ride off
other, low-tax, countries where U.S. multinationals generate income. In
addition, foreign governments have incentives to design their tax systems
to show a high rate of income tax that is eligible for the U.S. FTC. As
Gersovitz (1987) argues, the optimal strategy for a host country often is to
tax multinationals at a high rate while offering other direct or indirect
investment subsidies, thereby encouraging investment and allowing U.S.
firms to claim hefty FTCs. Baldwin (1986) reports that indirect subsidies for
multinational investment are quite common, including U.S. government
subsidies for foreign investment projects in the United States.

3. HOW BIG ARE U.S. TAXES?
Much of the preceding discussion was predicated on the assumption that
the U.S. tax rate on foreign source income exceeds foreign tax rates. If the
U.S. tax rate exactly equalled foreign tax rates, then the U.S. tax system
would raise no revenue from foreign sources and have no effect on the
overseas behavior of U.S. multinationals. Unfortunately, it is not easy to
construct summary statistics on the difference between U.S. and foreign tax
rates, since applicable statutory tax rates as well as depreciation and other
provisions vary widely from one country to another.
Table 4 presents some evidence on the relative historic magnitudes of
average foreign and U.S. tax rates on foreign source income of U.S.
multinationals. Of course, these tax rates represent tax collections as a
fraction of realized taxable income and so do not reflect many of the tax
incentives that affect investor decisions by encouraging lightly taxed
activities and discouraging business activities taxed at full rates. In addition, these figures do not incorporate unreported foreign income of U.S.
firms or the incentives generated by the tax system to earn foreign income
in ways that are easily hidden from U.S. tax authorities. Still, Table 4

TABLE 4
Average Foreign and U.S. Tax Rates on Realized Foreign Income, 1972-1982

Year

Branch
income

1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972

$14,572
21,871
11,275
6,413
n.a.
n.a.

Foreign Average
taxes on tax rate
(%)
branches
$5,630
10,088
5,036
4,146
n.a.
n.a.

38.6
46.1
44.7
64.6
n.a.
n.a.

CFC
income

Foreign
taxes on
CFCs

$36,696
47,621
n.a.
23,479
20,938
15,356

$14,077
16,440
n.a.
8,630
7,506
5,595

Taxable
foreign
income
Average of U.S.
cortax rate
(%)
porations
38.4
34.5
n.a.
36.8
35.8
36.4

$59,388
70,541
65,150
55,413
46,770
15,015

U.S. average
tax rate on U.S. average
current-year tax rate on
all corporate
foreign
income
income
FTCs

(%)

(%)

$18,932
24,880
26,358
23,547
20,175
5,813

6.8
17.5
4.6
6.4
19.8
7.2

36.5
46.6
43.2
46.2
54.4
43.1

Note: The table contains some very minor inconsistencies, since data for some years are available on returns only for those companies with
$250 million or more in assets. See the sources.

Source: Author's calculation based on data in U.S. Department of the Treasury (various years), Carson (1986), and Auerbach (1983b).
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presents a picture of foreign tax rates that are slightly lower than the
average U.S. corporate tax rate. As a result, U.S. taxes have generally been
due on foreign income received by U.S. corporations, though at a fairly low
average rate.
What does the evidence in Table 4 suggest about the likely effect of U.S.
taxes on overseas investments by U.S. multinationals? Since tax collections
on foreign source income are positive, it is tempting to infer that firms must
pay positive U.S. taxes on repatriated profits, a tax obligation they can defer
by continued reinvestment abroad. One difficulty in drawing that conclusion is that, once again, these tax rates reflect average rather than marginal
incentives for a firm's foreign investment. In addition, these numbers
represent averages across firms and countries. It may be that the CFCs of
individual firms located in particular countries face very high or very low
effective tax rates on their marginal investments. The TRA, with the
reduction in the U.S. corporate tax rate from 46 to 34 percent, is also likely
to change the relative sizes of U.S. and foreign tax rates. United States taxes
on multinational investment can be expected to diminish in importance;
Grubert and Mutti (1987) report Treasury estimates that 70 percent of U.S.
manufacturing companies will have excess FTCs.
Even if the U.S. Treasury collected no corporate revenue at all from
foreign source income, it would be a mistake to conclude that U.S. taxes
have no effect on foreign investment behavior of U.S. multinationals. As
discussed in the previous section, the U.S. tax system may induce U.S.
multinationals to reduce their U.S. tax liabilities by adjusting the rate at
which they pay out dividends, by modifying their use of tax deductions in
foreign countries, and by changing the location of overseas investments, all
of which have real effects on the after-tax returns available from investments in other countries. Consider the simple case in which a U.S.
corporation wants to repatriate some of the income earned by one of its
CFCs located in a foreign country with very high taxes. Taken alone, the
dividend payment would generate no additional U.S. tax liability, since the
associated FTCs exceed the average U.S. taxes that would have to be paid.
But by generating foreign tax in excess of the credit limit, this action
encourages the same U.S. parent company to repatriate income from CFCs
located in low-tax countries, since worldwide averaging permits the U.S.
parent to apply the high foreign taxes to the rest of its repatriated income
that year and bring the average down to the limit. This technique thereby
removes some of the repatriation disincentive for investments in low-tax
countries and may contribute to the popularity of tax havens as investment
locations. One implication of widespread use of this technique would be
average realized foreign tax rates on repatriated income near the U.S.
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statutory corporate rate, and low average U.S. tax rates on repatriated
income, both of which one observes.
None of this should be taken to minimize the importance of interfirm
heterogeneity in applicable marginal tax rates on foreign investments and
repatriations to the United States. Some firms carry forward unused FfCs
each year, whereas other firms pay substantial taxes on their foreign source
income. Although a similar tale can be told of the unused tax credits and
deductions of unprofitable domestic U.S. firms going to waste while other
U.S. firms face full tax rates (see Auerbach and Poterba (1987)), the rules
that apply to foreign source income make it particularly difficult for unused
FfCs to find their way into the books of companies that can exploit them.
Without tax data on individual firms one cannot know precisely their
incentives, but it is still possible to make some general observations about
the average tax incentives U.S. firms face. The next question is whether
observed behavior is consistent with those incentives.

4. FINANCIAL BEHAVIOR AND TAX INCENTIVES
Because profits earned abroad by the CFCs of U.S. multinationals are not
subject to U.S. taxation until received by their U.S. parents, it is to the
advantage of these CFCs to delay paying dividends as long as feasible,
thereby reducing the present value of the associated U.S. tax obligations. In
fact, one well might wonder why CFCs remit dividends to U.S. parents at
all, given the tax cost of doing so. A similar question arises in studies of the
financial behavior of domestic U.S. corporations, since individuals who
own corporate stock are typically taxed much more heavily on the dividends they receive than on their capital gains. Hence, shareholders should
prefer their companies to reinvest all their profits, in government bonds if
necessary, rather than pay dividends. By reinvesting the profits, the
companies would raise the value of their shares and shareholders could
take their returns in the form of lower-taxed share appreciation rather than
dividends. Or less subtly, corporations can and do return profits to
stockholders in lightly taxed form through share repurchases, as Shaven
(1987) documents.
In fact, domestic U.S. corporations pay out about one-quarter to onethird of their profits to their shareholders each year in dividends, as
indicated in the first column of Table 5. By contrast, column 3 of Table 5
reveals CFCs to payout a significantly higher fraction-almost half-of
their annual profits out in dividends each year. The accounting rules
underlying these ratios are somewhat arbitrary (see Poterba (1987) for a
discussion), but they reveal what appears to be a significant difference in
the financial behavior of domestic corporations and their CFCs. In order to
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TABLE 5

CFC Dividend Payouts and U.S. Corporate Dividend Payouts

1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972

Dividend
payout ratio,
all U.S.
corporations %

Implicit
shareholder
tax rate on
U.S.
dividends%

Dividend
payout
ratio, CFCs %

Average U.S. tax
rate on foreign
earnings%

30.6
23.9
22.3
24.2
28.7
26.8

24.8
30.5
28.7
28.6
28.2
28.6

64.8
45.3
n.a.
44.2
51.8
52.9

6.8
17.5
4.6
6.4
19.8
7.2

Note: First and second columns adapted form Poterba (1987).

Sources: Author's calculation based on data in U.S. Department of the Treasury (various) and States
(1980-1987). Some CFC data refer only to CFCs whose U.S. parent corporations have assets of at least
$250 million.

understand the source of this difference, it helps to explore the reasons
why firms pay dividends in the first place. Financial policy is particularly
important to the investment decisions of CFCs, since the Subpart F and
other rules imply that the tradeoff between dividends and investments in
plant and equipment is even stronger for them than it is for domestic firms.
Observers of U.S. corporate financial policy have proposed several explanations for the presence of significant dividend payments despite associated
tax costs. The most important of these explanations include the use of
dividend payouts by a firm's managers to signal profitability, the willingness
of tax-exempt and certain other shareholders to receive dividends rather than
accrue capital gains, and the possibility that a reinvested dollar may not raise
firm value by a full dollar. The first explanation relies on incompleteness of
information flows between firms and their shareholders. By paying dividends, firms reassure their shareholders and the market generally that
operations continue to be profitable. By contrast, a reduction in dividends
signals pessimistic news about current and future profitability and is likely to
depress firm value. Since publicly traded American firms are required to
release their financial information to the public, dividends under the signaling
interpretation must be conveying information beyond that which firms routinely make available through annual reports, 10-K filings, and the like. 10
The second explanation for dividend payouts by firms to shareholders is
the possibility that tax-exempt shareholders hold the stock of high-payout
10

Gordon and Malkiel (1981) explore the consequences of this view of dividend behavior.
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firms, making those payouts costless from a tax point of view. Then if
shareholders would have to incur transactions costs in selling stock, those
shareholders would prefer to receive their returns in the form of dividends
rather than capital gains. In addition, corporate shareholders can exclude
from their taxable income 85 percent of the dividends they receive from
domestic corporations, so they generally prefer to receive dividends rather
than capital gains.1 1
The third explanation of dividend behavior is the so-called "trapped
money" model: once a corporation earns money, it must choose either to
pay the money out as a dividend or to reinvest the money. Since
corporations are observed to pay some dividends, this model implies that
a marginal dollar reinvested in the firm produces the same after-tax addition
to shareholder value as would the same dollar paid as a dividend.
Assuming tax rates on capital gains to be lower than dividend taxes, it must
be the case that $1 of marginal investment financed by reinvested earnings
is sufficiently unproductive that it raises firm value by less than $1.1 2
Although none of these three models of firm financial policy appear to
explain every feature of domestic dividend behavior, it is worth considering how they can be applied to the dividend remittance decisions of CFCs
of U.S. multinationals. At first blush, it seems unlikely that information and
signaling problems would arise between CFCs and their U.S. multinational
parents, since it is all one company and the parent could in principle demand
to see detailed financial records, fire foreign managers, and exert control in
other ways. Furthermore, the U.S. parent as (in many cases) the only
shareholder need not be troubled by temporary changes in share value. But at
the same time, one cannot rule out the same kind of agency problems that
arise between ordinary corporate shareholders and their firm's managers.
Domestic managers of U.S. multinationals inevitably have less information
about the financial well-being of foreign affiliates than do their foreign
managers, and continued high-dividend payouts provide convincing evidence of the high quality of overseas operations. But this effect seems unlikely
to explain payout ratios that exceed even those of domestic corporations.
The second explanation for domestic dividends, the presence of low-tax
shareholder clienteles, says little about dividend remittances to heavily
taxed multinationals. But the third explanation, that corporate money is

Auerbach (1983a) finds some support in data on stock price movements for the hypothesis
that low-tax shareholders tend to own stock in firms with high dividend-payout ratios, but
even in his estimates these individuals prefer capital gains to dividends.

11

See Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981), and King (1977) for the development of this model.
Poterba and Summers (1985) do not find support for this theory in their recent examination of
U.K. data.
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"trapped" within inescapable tax barriers, appears to be very much to the
point of multinational financial planning. What can a CFC do with its
earnings when there appear to be no profitable foreign investment opportunities? The Subpart F rules prevent passive and other types of internationally invested income from going unrecognized by the U.S. tax system,
so dividends to parent companies entail no extra tax cost to the multinational. Of course, these dividends then represent income that the U.S.
parent corporation must either reinvest or pay out as dividends to its
shareholders. The profits of CFCs are thus subject to taxation three times:
they are taxed by foreign governments when earned, by the U.S. government when repatriated, and by the U.S. government when distributed
ultimately to stockholders. But CFCs cannot avoid indefinitely the last two
layers of taxation, and so should be expected to remit dividends in
response to declining foreign uses of capital. 13
Controlled foreign corporations need not pay dividends mechanically,
however: the model implies that payout ratios should be sensitive to the
associated U.S. tax obligations, and the evidence suggests that they are.
Recall from Table 5 that CFC payout ratios are higher than overall U.S.
corporate ratios, which is consistent with the lower average U.S. tax rate on
CFC dividends than on domestic corporate dividends paid to individual
shareholders. In addition, CFC payout ratios vary over time and between
CFCs as the U.S. taxes due on CFC dividends vary. Table 6 illustrates the
response of payouts to taxes with aggregate CFC data for 1980 and 1982. All
other things equal, CFCs facing the highest foreign taxes have incentives to
pay dividends at the highest rates, since these dividends may be untaxed
by the U.S. government and, indeed, through worldwide averaging these
dividends might reduce U.S. taxes due on foreign source income that was
lightly taxed by foreign governments. The last column of Table 6 suggests
that payout ratios do generally rise with foreign tax rates. This evidence is
consistent with other findings that the dividend policies of multinational
firms respond to foreign and U.S. tax regimes.

13 One implication of the model is that CFCs that pay dividends should never simultaneously
receive equity transfers from their parents. Jun (1987) presents new evidence that more than
a quarter of foreign affiliates pay dividends and receive transfers in the same year. But these
data do not conclusively reject the theory, since the sample includes branches as well as CFCs,
the transfers include debt as well as equity, and the timing of financial operations within the
year may be important here. Furthermore, under the current system of worldwide averaging,
U.S. parents desire immediate repatriation of profits earned by their CFCs located in countries
with taxes higher than U.S. rates, replenishing them if necessary with equity transfers in the
same year. The presence of CFCs in high-tax countries may account for Jun's findings.

14

See, for example, Kopits (1972) and Mutti (1981).

TABLE 6
Analysis of CFC Distributions

Total

Out of
current
earn. &
profits

Current
profits
distributed
as% of
after-tax
foreign
profits (%)

$33,123

$13,559

$9,424

28.5

$5,468
6,353
3,262
4,640
3,489
2,579
2,981

$1,537
1,926
1,190
1,344
1,703
1,194
1,625

$1,046
1,365
692
1,046
1,363
872
1,199

19.1
21.5
21.2
22.5
39.1
33.8
40.2

Current
earnings
and
profits
before
taxes

Foreign
income
taxes

After-tax
foreign
profits

$47,617

$14,494

$5,468
6,610
3,812
6,154
5,355
4,489
5,626

$ 257
550
1,514
1,866
1,910
2,645

Distributions

CFCs of Large U.S. Corporations, 1982
Total with taxes as % of current
profits:
zero
0-10
10-20
20-30
30-40
40-45
45-50

50-60
60-80
80-100
Over 100%

4,280
3,208
1,389
169

2,305
2,157
1,258
280

1,975
1,051
131
-111

1,129
1,295
150
-115

839
666
58

42.5
63.4
44.3

CFCs of All U.S. Corporations, 1980
Total
zero
0-10
10-20
20-30
30-40
40-45
45-50
50-60
60-80
80-100
over 100%

$55,795
$ 4,516
7,393
4,995
7,307
10,613
8,667
5,385
4,990
2,050
762
128

$16,737
$ 268
741
1,872
3,699
2,901
2,540
2,677
1,341
659
188

$39,058
$ 4,516
7,125
4,254
5,435
6,914
5,766
2,845
2,313
709
103
-60

$13,199
$ 991
2,358
1,013
1,551
2,641
1,288
1,263
1,251
455
166
56

$9,639
$ 536
1,789
765
1,240
1,817
1,087
1,039
848
335
87

24.7
11.9
25.1
18.0
22.8
26.3
18.9
36.5
36.7
47.2
84.5

Note: These data refer only to those CFCs with positive earnings and profits for the current year. Data for 1982 are available only for CFCs of U .5. parent
corporations with at least $250 million in assets.
Sources: States (1986-1987) and U.S. Department of the Treasury (1985).
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5. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES AND U.S. INVESTMENT
ABROAD
The tax incentive for U.S. firms to invest abroad is a subject of major policy
interest. As earlier discussion indicates, any individual firm's tax incentives
depend on its available tax credit carryforwards, earnings, and tax history
against which to carry back deductions and credits, fungibility of currentyear dividend repatriations from CFCs in high- and low-tax countries,
borrowing opportunities, and a host of other factors. In addition, when
new investment opportunities arise, they can be exploited in a number of
different forms.
United States multinationals can choose from among three primary
methods of investing in foreign countries: branch investments, CFC
investments financed out of new transfers of debt or equity from the parent
corporation, and CFC investments financed out of retained earnings. Since
it is not dear with which of these methods marginal multinational investments take place, it is necessary to analyze the investment tax incentives for
all three.
Foreign branch investments are seemingly the most straightforward,
since repatriation-timing issues do not arise because branches are taxed
currently in the U.S. on all their earnings and profits. As mentioned earlier,
the U.S. tax treatment of foreign branches differs from the tax treatment of
analogous domestic U.S. investment in that branches must pay taxes to
foreign governments at rates possibly higher than U.S. tax rates, and
branches are not entitled to some domestic investment incentives such as
the investment tax credit and short asset lifetimes for tax depreciation
purposes. One big tax advantage that branch organization may offer a U.S.
multinational is that foreign branch losses reduce domestic taxable profits
dollar for dollar. Since U.S. multinationals are not permitted to use CFC
losses to reduce domestic or foreign taxable income, it may be in the
interest of firms expecting loss years to organize their foreign operations as
branches. It is widely argued that the tax losses associated with oil and
natural gas exploration and development motivated U.S. oil companies to
form foreign branches rather than CFCs for their overseas operations.
Naturally, legal, regulatory, and political considerations also may affect the
decision to form a foreign branch rather than a CFC.
New investments financed out of the retained earnings of existing CFCs
have the tax advantage of avoiding direct U.S. taxation of either the
principal or subsequent profits until profits are repatriated. It is this feature
that motivated Hartman (1985) to argue that only the foreign country's tax
system affects the marginal incentive for CFCs to invest out of retained
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earnings. Although Hartman's conclusion is correct for the stylized model
he constructs, it is not accurate to conclude that U.S. CFCs with retained
earnings face no marginal investment incentives from the U.S. tax code. In
particular, the difference between the U.S. definition of foreign earnings
and profits and the foreign definition of taxable income generally produces
a tax burden on U.S. multinational investment in excess of the foreign
effective tax rate.
No two foreign tax systems look exactly alike; however, they typically
share the feature that they encourage corporate investment through
incentives such as very rapid tax write-off of depreciation charges for new
investments. Canada, for example, has very generous investment incentives in the manufacturing industries. When U.S. multinationals make
investments through their CFCs, they must calculate their earnings and
profits based on "U.S. accounting principles," which provide, among other
things, for tax depreciation of investment expenses at slow rates over long
depreciable lifetimes. As a result, a new U.S. investment in Canada
generates a present value of U.S.-definition earnings and profits that is
higher than the present value of Canadian-defined taxable income.
This difference in U.S. and foreign definitions of income, along with the
method by which tax credits are computed, means that the U.S. corporate
tax rate and U.S. rules for depreciation of foreign property generally
combine to discourage even the marginal investments of U.S.-owned CFCs
that use retained earnings. The reason the U.S. tax system has this effect is
that a new CFC investment will in general change the calculated value of a
firm's average foreign tax rate that is used in the tax credit computation. As
a result, even though the profits from a new CFC investment may not be
themselves subject to U.S. taxation, the accounting rules work in such a
way that this investment reduces the FTC the U.S. parent firm is eligible to
take on profits from other foreign investments made by the same CFC, as
long as the tax rate on marginal investments is lower than the average tax
rate paid that year. A complete calculation of the true tax incentives for CFC
investments should include this effect along with the standard tax incentive
provided by foreign law.
By defining foreign income in this way, the U.S. tax law discourages U.S.
overseas investments in countries with significantly different income definitions. It is difficult to establish in practice exactly how much of a
difference these accounting rules make in the level of reported earnings,
but Table 7 provides some suggestion that the difference may be quite
substantial. As the table reports, the measured profit margins on sales by
CFCs of U.S. multinationals are consistently significantly higher than profit
margins of all U.S. corporations. To be sure, these higher profit margins
undoubtedly also reflect the different natures of domestic and multinational
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TABLE 7
Profit Margins of CFCs and All U.S. Corporations Compared

Controlled Foreign Corporations

1982
1980
1976
1974
1972

Business
receipts

Current
earnings and
profits before
taxes

Profit
margin(%)

$647.9
699.0
342.8
281.3
172.4

$36.7
47.6
23.5
20.9
15.4

5.66
6.81
6.85
7.44
8.91

Profit
margins of
all U.S.
corporations
(%)

3.51
4.17
5.50
5.11
4.82

Note: Dollar amounts are billions of current dollars.

Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury (1985) and Simenauer (1986).

businesses, the efforts of U.S. multinationals to transfer at reduced prices their
high-profit assets to CFCs and away from U.S. taxing jurisdiction, and other
business activities of multinationals. Furthermore, it is not obvious how one is
to interpret evidence on profit margins, since firms try to maximize profits
rather than their margins. Given the limited financial data available, however,
the size of CFC profit margins as measured by U.S. accounting principles
suggests that use of these principles may substantially overstate CFC profits
(relative to the U.S. definition) and, by extension, reduce U.S. multinational
tax credits and discourage CFC reinvestment.
Table 8 presents calculations of adjusted effective tax rates for investments made out of retained earnings by CFCs of U.S. multinationals in
selected industrial countries in 1982. 15 Column 4 contains estimates of
effective tax rates for reinvested CFC earnings without correcting for the
U.S. definition of foreign income. These effective tax rates are basically the
same as those faced by foreign firms reinvesting in their own countries.
Column 5 presents corrected effective tax rates for U.S. CFCs. With the
exception of West Germany, the corrected effective tax rates are higher than
the uncorrected rates, significantly so in Canada and the United Kingdom
where the governments offer very fast depreciation write-offs on new
capital as investment incentives. By contrast, West Germany insists on
slow capital cost recovery so the U.S. tax system encourages investment
there relative to the incentives faced by West German firms.
These effective tax rate calculations are based on the same assumptions
15 Among these countries, the United Kingdom has significantly changed its taxation of
corporate profits since 1982.

TABLE 8

Effective Tax Rates and U.S. Affiliate Investment Abroad, 1982
Start of year
property, plant
and
equipment,
U.S. affiliates
All countries

$155.7

Canada

$31.9

West Germany

$12.8

United Kingdom

$28.8

Japan

$2.5

Brazil

$6.8

Investment, all
industries
(manufacturing
investment)
$44.0
($16.5)
$6.9
($2.4)
$3.0
($2.2)
$7.6
($4.1)
$0.9
($0.7)
$1.9
($1.4)

Investment/
capital: all
industries
(manufacturing)

Foreign ETR,
reinvestment

Adjusted
ETR for
U.S.
CFCs

(%)

(%)

(%)

19.2

36.9

68.3

66.8

21.2

52.5

28.3
(10.6)
21.6
(7.5)
23.4
(17.2)
26.4
(14.2)
36.0
(28.0)
27.9
(20.6)

44.0
61.7

•

46.5
62.6

Note: Data refer to majority-owned nonbank affiliates of nonbank U.S. parents. Investment is plant and equipment expenditures by affiliates. Dollar amount
are billions of current (1982) dollars.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1985).

58

Hines

embodied in Auerbach's (1983b) estimates of effective tax rates on U.S.
domestic investment: firms choose accounting policies to minimize taxes,
and investors require 4 percent real after-tax returns. For these estimates,
inflation expectations are assumed to be static, firms invest in asset
combinations similar to aggregate U.S. corporate investment, and these
assets depreciate at the same rates as those assumed by Auerbach for the
United States. In addition, the average realized U.S. tax rate on foreign
income is assumed to be 10 percent, and the average dividend payout ratio
on the CFCs other investments is assumed to be 50 percent. Though
stylized, these assumptions correspond to observed average behavior of
U.S. CFCs. 16 Foreign tax parameters are based on data from Price Waterhouse (various), where when necessary values were chosen which correspond most closely to the foreign tax treatment of new manufacturing
investment. Given the special tax provisions affecting other important
industries, it probably makes the most sense to interpret these effective tax
rates as applying primarily to manufacturing firms. As such, they can be
compared to effective tax rates of around 25 percent, which Auerbach
(1983b) estimates for domestic U.S. manufacturing investment in 1982. The
adjusted effective tax rates on foreign investments are uniformly higher.
It is instructive to associate the investment/capital ratios in column 3 of
Table 8 with the corresponding effective tax rates. In a first pass there
appears to be little correlation: Japan and Brazil exhibit the highest
investment ratios without having the lowest effective tax rates. But Japan's
adjusted effective tax rate is the second lowest, and the table may illustrate
the importance of adjusting foreign effective tax rates to account for the
effects of U.S. taxes. Without doing so, Canada and the United Kingdom
show by far the lowest effective tax rates, and their 1982 investment ratios
suggest that such investment incentives may be absent. In fact, the wedge
between domestic effective tax rates and the effective tax rate on foreign
investment may partly account for lagging foreign investment behavior.
Naturally, it is a mistake to infer too much from one year's worth of
investment and tax data. This is particularly true when different types of
investments face different tax rates, and Table 8 presents data only on the
tax rates on CFC profits reinvested in manufacturing (though other tax
rates should move more or less in tandem). Unfortunately, one has few
options in this case. Table 8 presents data for 1982 because it is the only
recent year for which the U.S. Commerce Department has detailed survey
Of course, these calculations illustrate that marginal investment incentives are sensitive to
a firm's average foreign tax rate, and these tax rates differ widely. The reported numbers are
based on overall average foreign tax rates, but these may not be the average foreign tax rates
of marginal investors.
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data on U.S. multinationals. The multinational investment and tax picture
is likely to look very different with the U.S. passage of the TRA and the
excess FTCs it generates. Furthermore, U.S. domestic tax incentives were
largely removed by the Act, and it remains to be seen whether U.S.
multinationals are thereby encouraged to move more of their operations
and investments abroad.

6. CONCLUSION
Taxes have historically played an important role in influencing multinational
investment decisions. Although the consequences of the incentives offered by
tax havens are plainly visible, the effect of U.S. taxes on the foreign investments of American multinationals may be no less real. Contrary to the claims
of earlier authors, the U.S. tax system appears to have had a significant
influence on marginal after-tax returns available to investors in foreign assets.
There are several channels for this influence of the U.S. tax system. The
U.S. tax code defines income differently than do foreign governments for
their own tax purposes, which has generally worked to discourage U.S.
multinational investments in countries with strong investment incentives.
The potential tax obligation due the U.S. government on repatriation of
foreign earnings has influenced multinational financial policy, encouraging
firms to pay dividends from high-tax sources and retain earnings (thereby
investing) in low-tax countries. The generally heavy taxation of U.S.
individual shareholders on dividends encourages U.S. corporations to
retain earnings to a greater degree than they would otherwise, and foreign
affiliates of U.S. multinationals should be subject to the same incentive.
Finally, though not explored here, U.S. taxes may affect the profitability of
overseas investments by U.S. multinationals through influencing the rate
of accumulation of complementary capital in the United States.
The TRA appears to change many of these incentives. By reducing the
U.S. tax rate, the Act all but relieves most U.S. multinationals of U.S. tax
obligations on their foreign income. But time will tell what the long-run
effects of tax reform will be on multinational investment. Possibly much of
the effect will depend on the reaction of foreign governments to U.S. tax
changes, a process that is difficult to predict and still appears to be evolving.
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